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Summary 
In this paper the Keiler (1980)-framework for an applied general equili-
brium model is adapted to allow for rationing of households. To accomplish 
this, the concept of virtual prices (Neary and Roberts, 1980) is used.Due 
to this adaption, the calibration of this type of linearized models to a 
benchmark-year data-set, must be adapted too. After outlining these 
changes, the adapted calibration-method is applied to a Dutch historical 
time-series. Afterwards, the modified framework is used for a dis-
aggregated 114-sector model of The Netherlands in 1981. The results show 
that this adaption to allow for rationing is quite important for the model 
outcomes. 

EXCESS DEMAND IN THE KELLER MODEL 
1. Introduction 
In this paper some enhancements to a particular Applied General Equilibrium 
model are presented. The framework of this model was developed by Keiler 
(1980), and originally used for a model of the Dutch economy of 1973. 
Although this model is constructed according to specific assumptions about 
the behaviour of the various economie agents, the enhancements are based 
upon general mechanisms which can be used in other Applied General 
Equilibrium models as well. Here, the Keiler-model is expanded to allow for 
price-rigidities and rationing of households, following Cornielje and 
Keiler (1983), Cornielje (1985) and Cornielje and Van der Laan (1986). 
In the remainder of this section the skeleton of the Keiler-model is 
outlined. Section 2 presents a summary of the theoretical backgrounds of 
household rationing. The construction of a benchmark-year data set under 
rationing is studied. Section 3 presents the application of the methods 
developed in section 2 to a time-series of 'Total Accounts' as presented in 
Cornielje (1989). In section 4 an application to the 114-sector Keiler-
model for The Netherlands, 1981, is presented. This latter model has first 
been used in Keiler e.a., 1988. In an appendix the computational changes to 
the original framework in Keiler (1980) are sketched. 
In figure 1 the components of the Keiler model are sketched. The Keiler 
model describes an economy as a set of three types of agents, consumers 
(households), producers (firms) and a fisc. Consumers and producers demand 
and supply goods, which are both commodities and factors of production. The 
goods are sold and bought on markets. Each agent faces net (effective) 
prices, including transaction taxes, when buying or selling goods. These 
prices differ from the market prices due to taxes. The tax yields are 
collected by the fisc. The fisc redistributes this tax yield to the 
consumers as lump-sum income. Total income of a consumer consists of this 
lump-sum income and the yield of the goods sold. For all actors, total 
income equals total expenditures by definition. 
Figure 1 The skeleton of the Keiler model 
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The Keiler-model describes a static equilibrium, which can be altered by 
changes in the exogenous tax rates. Intertemporal effects are not taken 
into account, except for savings and the production of capital goods. 
The original model assumes full competition on all markets. Demand and 
supply is equalized at all markets by instantaneous adaption of all prices 
and the total tax-yield. 
Consumers optimize their utility function with respect to their budget 
constraint. Producers optimize their profit with respect to the techno-
logical production constraint. As a result of the assumption of free entry 
and exit of firms, excess profit is zero and the production constraints 
show constant returns to scale. Consumers and producers face nested 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution utility and production functions (see 
Keiler, 1976). These functions may be considered as local approximations to 
an unspecified global utility or production function. Non-unitary income 
elasticities of consumers are allowed for by a shift of the origin of the 
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commodity space. The parameters of individual behaviour are determined by 
'guestimation', i.e. inspection of the literature on consumer economics, 
and by the cost and income shares of respectively firms and households. 
Cost and income shares are derived from the so called Total Accounts, which 
are a variant of the Social Accounting Matrices. These Accounts are also 
used for determination of the average tax rates. Marginal tax rates may 
differ from average rates. Then, these marginal rates have to be determined 
from study of tax laws. 
Savings are modeled as the demand for capital goods. Capital goods are 
the only source of wealth which can be transferred to the next period. 
Capital goods are produced by one artificial firm sector, demanding the 
investments done by other firms. Savings are a constant fraction of house-
hold income. As this constant fraction of income may differ among house-
holds, savings are modeled in a Kaldorian style. Except for 'replacements' 
due to depreciation, and wear and tear, investments are done by households. 
Therefore, firm savings by retained earnings are fully ascribed to house-
hold sectors, while replacements are modeled by demand for capital goods of 
firms. 
Investments do not increase the capital stock in the period under 
consideration. Therefore, the distribution of the investments to the 
various production sectors can be discarded of. The existing capital stock 
is perfectly mobile. The usage of the existing capital stock is modeled as 
the demand and supply of 'capital services'. The market price of these 
capital services is equalized among firms due to the perfect mobility. 
No money occurs. The actors do not experience some form of 'money 
illusion'. Normalization of prices takes place by usage of some basket of 
goods. This basket is chosen such that the lump-sum redistribution by the 
fisc is independent of changes in this price-index. 
The foreign sector and public sector are modeled as distinct household 
or production sectors. The foreign sector is represented as a household 
which shows a perfect elastic reaction to non-proportional price changes of 
the goods exported from the country under consideration as result of the 
'small open country' assumption. The price structure of imports is fixed 
and therefore imports can be considered as one good, according to Hicks' 
composite commodity theorem (see Hicks, 1946). Imports compete directly 
with domesticly produced goods. The demand for imports is modeled as demand 
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for the output of firms, while firms demand the imports as part of their 
input into the production process. In the production process imports and 
domestic production are aggregated into one output, which is demanded by 
other firms and the households. Thus, the Armington assumption, that 
imports and exports are distinct goods, holds. 
The public sector is modeled as a household, which demands various 
inputs to 'produce' public welfare. Alternatively, the public sector is 
split into one firm producing public goods, and one household, demanding 
these public goods. lts demand for the various goods is fixed according to 
a Leontief utility function. When policy measures are compared, public 
budget is balanced to retain a constant public utility level. If one 
assumes a private utility function, which is separable between the utility 
derived from the consumption of the public good and the utility derived 
from the private goods consumption, then the change in the latter repre-
sents the change in total utility if public utility is kept constant. Thus, 
the concept of differential incidence is used. 
The model is solved by log-linearizing all behaviourial relations and 
equilibrium conditions. Therefore, the results are valid for small changes 
of the exogenous policy variables only. 
The changes of individual welfare are measured by the compensating 
variation expressed as a percentage of sectoral or national income. The 
impact of various tax measures can be normalized such that the welfare of 
the public household increases by 1% of its income. This facilitates the 
study of the differential budget incidence. 
2. Rationing by virtual taxes 
The method to introducé rationing in the model uses the concept of 'virtual 
taxation' or 'virtual prices'. This concept is based on Neary and Roberts 
(1980), who draw on the paper of Rothbard (1941). The method is also used 
in Grais e.a (1986) for Turkey. Cornielje and Keiler (1983) first applied 
this method to the Keiler model for the Netherlands in 1973 but had to make 
some approximations about the second order effects of redistribution of the 
virtual tax yield. In this paper the method is incorporated in the Keiler 
model using the linearized nature of the model. Cornielje and Van der Laan 
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(1986) have proven that a virtual tax equilibrium is equivalent with a 
Drèze-type equilibrium with price-rigidities for exchange economies. 
In this section the theory of representing rationing by virtual taxation is 
summarized shortly. Then, the adaptions necessary to the benchmark year 
data-set are explored. Initially rationing occurs. Therefore, the absolute 
level of virtual taxation must be determined and incorporated into the 
initial equilibrium. The calibration method of matching a mathemetical 
framework of an applied general equilibrium model to a benchmark year data-
set must be altered to provide for the additional Information about excess 
demands. The results as presented in Cornielje (1985) are repeated shortly. 
There, a method is derived by which it is possible to calibrate a rationed 
household to a given observation of its trade and excess demand. In Mansur 
and Whalley (1984), calibration of a general equilibrium model is 
decomposed into smaller problems of calibrating individual agents, each of 
which can be handled separately. They provide a simple example for a 
household with a single level CES utility function and unitary income 
elasticities. lts demand is matched to trade as observed in a so-called 
benchmark-year data set, using a pre-determined estimate of the Allen 
elasticity of substitution. This example is extended in Cornielje (1984) to 
generalized multi-level CES utility functions as proposed by Keiler (1976). 
These functions allow for non-unitary income elasticities too. There, 
besides the knot-structure of the utility-function, and accompanying 
elasticities of substitution, pre-determined income elasticities have to be 
known in order to calibrate the utility function. 
In case of disequilibria on some markets, thus of rationed agents, the 
proposed methods in Mansur and Whalley (1984) and Cornielje (1984) are 
inappropriate because it is assumed that actual trade is equal to notional 
demand and supply. In this section an adaption of the calibration method is 
derived for such situations. 
We suppose that only observations are given about real expenditure flows, 
relative prices paid by each agent and the magnitude of the excess demands. 
Then we show how rationing can be represented by virtual prices and income 
compensations and how these prices can be determined given observed excess 
demands and known demand functions. Next, we combine this idea of 
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representing rationing by virtual taxes and calibration into one method to 
determine some unknown parameters of the demand functions and virtual 
prices simultaneously, using the observations as given above. 
First, we introducé some terminology and the concept of virtual prices. 
From now on we will speak of demand only and denote supply by negative 
demand. Let pn be the observed price of a good n - 1 N, p* its virtual 
price depending on the actual trade zk , k - 1, ...,N and A* - (p*-pn)zn the 
virtual lump-sum transfer which accompanies the imposition of the virtual 
tax at rate t*n = (P;-pn)/pn. Let ^  (pk , k - 1 N; \\fi), n - 1 N be 
the unconstrained Marshallian demand functions, where A is lump-sum income 
and f} is a vector of parameters. Then we define for each good n - 1,...,N 
notional demand by 
qn - gn( pk, k - 1.....N; A | 0 ) , (1) 
effective demand by 
In = g n ( P n ; P * . k o n , k - 1 N; A + E A*| fi ) (2) 
k*n 
and constraïned demand by 
N 
q* - Sn(p*. k=l,...,N; A + S A* | p ) (3) 
k-1 
where q* - zn, and, therefore, p*, n - 1 N is, in fact, the solution 
of the last set of equations. The definition of effective demand 
corresponds to the one given by Benassy (1975) where effective demand is 
defined to be the demand on a market taking into account the rationing 
constraints at other markets only. 
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Suppose observations are available for qn, zn, pn, n - 1,...,N and A for, 
say, one benchmark year. Then p*, n - 1 N can be solved from the set 
of constrained demand equations (3) if the functional form g^ (.) and the 
vector fi are known. Under conditions given by Neary and Roberts (1980) such 
a solution exists; in particular if gj = zn for a good n then p* = pn . 
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However, the observations of the excess demands qn - zn , n — 1,...,N are 
not used. Thus, evaluating these excess demands from the computed virtual 
prices may result in different values with respect to the observed ones. 
The core problem of calibration is to match demand functions exactly to 
observed demands by determining not yet specified parameters in the demand 
system. So, suppose that besides the virtual prices p*, n = 1 N the N-
1 vector f} is not yet known. Then calibration under rationing is equal to 
solving the sets of equations (2) and (3) simultaneously for fi and p*, n = 
1 N, where the left-hand sides are observed. At most N-1 parameters and 
N-1 virtual prices can be determined as only N-1 independent equations are 
given by (3) as result of Walras' law, and as only N-1 equations are given 
by (2) because N-1 markets can be in disequilibrium simultaneously. 
As no explicit solution is available in general, we propose to solve (2) 
and (3) iteratively, by solving in each iteration /3 from (3) for a given 
set of virtual prices and these prices from (2) for the determined /J, and 
using these new values in the next iteration, etc., until the process 
converges. If no rationing occurs the process stops after one iteration as 
p* - pn, n - 1 N. This turns out to be the original calibration method 
with an additional check on the outcomes. Therefore the method proposed can 
be seen as a direct extension of the normal calibration method to one suit-
able for disequilibrium situations. 
When applied to the Keiler model, an important implication of the method 
proposed is that it assumes that the local behaviour as described by the 
marginal income elasticities and the substitution elasticities of a multi-
level CES-function determines global behaviour as described by global CES-
functions. Thus, the implicit assumption of this model, that the descript-
ion of local behaviour by these parameters is without loss of generality, 
and is only an approximation of global behaviour, is lost. Then, the strong 
assumption that global behaviour is described by the global utility 
function as used for calibration, must be made. 
Care must be taken with the interpretation of the magnitude of virtual tax 
rates. A high rate does not automatically imply a heavy distortion, as this 
rate is inversely related to the elasticities of substitution. These elas-
ticities depend upon the level of disaggregation of goods and sectors. For 
7 
example, disaggregation of rationed goods, combined with high elasticities 
of substitution between the composites and an uneven distribution of the 
rationing levels among these composites might result in lower virtual tax 
rates. 
3. The level of virtual labour taxes in the Netherlands, 1979-1984 
In table 1 a summary is given of the Dutch private household expenditures 
for necessities, luxuries, savings, labour and capital services for the 
years 1979-1984. As before, negative amounts refer to supply of goods. The 
amounts in part A refer to net payments and in part B to tax payments by 
the private household. The figures are from the so called 'Total Accounts'. 
Total Accounts are related to the widely used Social Accounting Matrices 
(SAM's), which are composed for many less developed countries (see Pyatt 
and Round, 1985, and see CBS, 1987, 1989). Total Accounts give a summary of 
demands and supplies by household and firm sectors expressed as expenditure 
flows, together with the tax payments by these sectors. Tax payments are 
divided into lump-sum taxes and commodity taxes. Lump-sum taxes are treated 
as negative 'lump-sum transfers', and are therefore subtracted from e.g. 
social security transfers, while the level of transaction taxes depends on 
the amounts paid (ad valorem taxes, e.g. VAT and labour taxes) or on the 
quantity transferred (excise taxes). The sum of lump-sum income and all 
negative demands (= supplies) is called the total income of a household. 
Here, the method to construct a 'Total Accounts' as given in Keiler (1980) 
is used. The latter method has been programmed into a Lotus 123-worksheet, 
which needs as input some figures from the yearly published National 
Accounts (see CBS 1981-1986). 
In table 1 part C gives the net prices paid by the private household for 
each good, relative to the market prices, which are normalized to be 1. In 
part D the average number of unemployed and the total employment are given 
for these years. If we suppose that the number of unemployed is an exact 
measure for excess demand on the labour market, if we suppose other markets 
were in equillbrium each year, and if we assume a particular utility 
function to prevail with a particular parameter set, partially fixed for 
all years and partially changing between years, we can determine the 
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virtual price level on the labour market for each year by using the 
calibration method proposed in section 2. 
Table 1 The Dutch private household sector 1979-1984 
Year 
Good 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
A. Expenditures and Lump-•sum income (*106 Gids.) 
1. Consumption 194040 207500 215280 224060 232170 239160 
2. Savings 30590 24830 29570 39210 42660 49730 
3. Labour -103346 -107523 -108377 -108586 -102019 -104282 
4. Capital services -26294 -21807 -25263 -33974 -45841 -58638 
Lumpsum income 94990 103000 111210 120710 126970 125970 
B. Taxes paid (*106 Gids, 
. ; 
1. Consumption 26504 28700 29198 29718 31349 33443 
2. Savings -4080 -7300 -8130 -8300 -7690 -8680 
3. Labour 65810 71779 74805 81153 88135 86693 
4. Capital services 2590 2541 2575 2777 2895 2987 
C. Relative prices paid 
1. Consumption 1.158 1.161 1.157 1.153 1.156 1.163 
2. Savings 0.882 0.773 0.784 0.825 0.847 0.851 
3. Labour 0.611 0.600 0.592 0.572 0.537 0.556 
4. Capital services 0.910 0.896 0.908 0.924 0.941 0.951 
D. Employment and Unemployment (*1000)x 
Total Employment 4773 4807 4736 4619 4513 4528 
Registered Unemployment 281 325 480 655 801 822 
Jouree : CEP, 1988. 
We suppose the household to behave according to a generaleed multi-level 
CES utility function (see, Keiler 1976). lts substitution structure is 
given in figure 2. Notice that the capital services are excluded from the 
utility tree as its supply is fixed. 
From table 2 it can be seen that between 1979 and 1983 the real and virtual 
labour taxes have risen. As unemployment has risen rapidly, the total 
amount of unemployment benefits has risen too. These social benefits are 
mainly financed by labour taxation. Therefore, labour taxes paid by the 
private household have risen too. If it is true that the labour prices paid 
by the demanders of labour have remain stable, then it can be concluded 
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that the government has acted quite rationally by imposing these labour tax 
increases to finance the social security benefits. In a sense, the partial 
imposition of virtual taxes has not disturbed the general equilibrium at 
all. Thus, the government has used the freedom given by the implicit 
virtual tax level due to unemployment to finance a social benefit policy of 
income redistribution without affecting behaviour of the private household 
and thus without affecting general equilibrium. 
Figure 2 The private household utility tree for 1979-1984 
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Table 2 Excess demand, real and virtual tax on and virtual price for labour 
Year 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Excess demand (%) 
Real labour tax1 
Virtual labour tax2 
Virtual labour price 
5.89 
0.389 
0.469 
0.324 
6.76 
0.400 
0.498 
0.301 
10.14 
0.408 
0.568 
0.256 
14.18 
0.428 
0.617 
0.219 
17.68 
0.463 
0.637 
0.195 
18.15 
0.454 
0.637 
0.198 
with respect to the market wage 
2
 with respect to the net wage 
From table 3 it can be seen that the market price for labour has remained 
quite stable, if one accounts for the 'general' decrease of the value of 
money by inflation. Further, it can be concluded that the labour prices 
paid by the public sector and the firms have remained relatively stable, if 
the inflation rate has been accounted for. Only, if the labour unions would 
have succeeded to force market wage increases in order to compensate for 
the tax increases, imposed on households, the real equilibrium would have 
been affected. This has not happened. 
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Table 3 Labour price, inflation, labour productivity increase and taxation 
rates on labour per sector for 1978-1984 
Year 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Market Price (Gids)1 35440 
ld., Increase (%) 
Inflation (%)2 
Labour Productivity (%)2 
Labour tax (% of market 
price) paid by: 
Firm sector 
Public sector 
Private sector 
37300 38679 41077 41967 42176 
5.2 3.7 6.2 2.2 0.5 
6.9 6.3 5.3 2.7 2.0 
0.6 3.3 2.7 6.8 5.8 
21.0 21.3 21.4 20.8 21.6 21.2 
39.1 39.3 38.8 36.9 40.8 39.7 
38.9 40.0 40.8 42.8 46.3 45.4 
1
 This figure is computed as (net labour income + taxes on labour paid by 
the private household)/total employment. See tables 1 and 2. 
2
 Source: CEP, 1988. 
Therefore, the claim of the government in those years that the Dutch social 
security system was a burden on the economy, and that it, therefore, 
aggravated unemployment can be partially invalidated. Of course, the effect 
on economie growth cannot be determined in this model. But, for the real 
and virtual taxation levels given, the general equilibria have not been 
affected, as a decrease of the social security benefit levels and the 
accompanying taxes would have induced an opposite effect on the virtual tax 
level and accompanying virtual lump-sum benefit. Of course, this is only 
true at this very high level of aggregation, where distribution aspects of 
the tax-system between various households is abstracted from. 
In section 3 two questions will be addressed in a an application to the 
114-sector model of the Netherlands in 1981. First, it will be 
investigated, how the introduction of virtual taxes at the initial 
equilibrium affects the outcomes for real tax changes. Second, the question 
will be addressed how price rigidities supported by virtual tax changes 
influence the model outcomes. 
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4 An application to the 114-sector model 
In this section, the virtual-tax idea to represent rationing is applied to 
the 114-sector version of the Keiler model (Keiler, 1980) for the Dutch 
economy in 1981. The model has been used too in Keiler e.a. (1988), Van de 
Stadt e.a. (1989), and Zeelenberg e.a. (1989) for evaluation of recent tax 
proposals of the Dutch government. Here, the model is applied to the 
Netherlands' economy in 1981, distinguishing 114 sectors and 65 goods. We 
will carry out a simulation of a subsidy on low-paid labour services. In 
recent years, such a subsidy has been proposed by several authors as a 
means of reducing unemployment among low-paid workers, which, as we will 
see below, is about twice as large as unemployment amomg other employees. 
Most authors propose a subsidy (e.g. a decrease of social contributions) 
that is highest for wages equal to the minimum wage and gradually decreases 
for wages above the minimum wage. 
The 114 sectors consist of 57 firm sectors (including the production of 
public goods by the government), the capital goods sector, the public 
sector, the rest of the world, 52 private household sectors, and 2 
fictitious household sectors that administer accumulated corporate savings 
and pension and Life insurance wealth of households. The data are derived 
from the National accounts (CBS, 1986), the input-output tables (CBS, 
1984), the Socio-economic accounts (CBS, 1988), and the Income statistics 
(CBS, 1985, 1986b); the data, together with several simulations, will be 
published in CBS (1990). 
The firm sectors are identical to the industries in the input-output table. 
The private household sectors are identical to the household sectors of the 
Socio-economic accounts: a cross-classification of households by socio-
economic status (private employees, public employees, pensioners, 
recipients of other social benefits, and self-employed), household size (1 
person, 2 persons, and 3 or more persons), and income class (25%-groups of 
net household income); households of self-employed are not further divided 
according to size or income class. The number of households varies 
considerably across sectors, from 2,000 to 500,000; 8 household sectors 
make up for 50 per cent of all households. 
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The 65 goods consist of the 57 products of the firm sectors, one type of 
capital goods, 2 types of imported products (competing and complementary 
imports), 4 types of labour services (low-paid, medium-paid, and high-paid 
labour services of employees, and labour services of self-employed), and 
capital services. Low-paid labour services correspond to gross wages up to 
1.2 times the minimum wage, medium-paid labour services to gross wages from 
1.2 until 1.7 times the minimum-wage, and high-paid labour services to 
gross wages above 1.7 times the minimum-wage. 
The price and income elasticities are derived from detailed econometrie 
studies of household and firm behavior. Most price elasticities of 
households are computed from the time-series study by Keiler and Van Driel 
(1985), the income elasticities from the cross-section study by Van Driel 
(1987), and the price elasticities of firms from the time-series analysis 
by Donkers and Kreijger (1985). The elasticities are specified by means of 
nested CES functions. 
The aggregate income elasticity of labour supply is about -0.2. Supply of 
capital services is assumed to be constant, so that its income elasticity 
and its partial elasticity of substitution with other goods are 0. The 
aggregate income elasticity of capital goods (savings) is about 2, and the 
partial elasticity of substitution between capital goods on the one hand 
and products and labour on the other hand is equal to 1; this implies that 
the interest elasticity of savings is about 0.2. The partial elasticity of 
substitution between supply of employee labour and supply of self-employed 
labour is equal to 1, and the partial elasticity between the 3 types of 
labour services of employees is also equal to 1. For most household sectors 
this implies an own-price elasticity of employee-labour supply of about 0.2 
and an own-price elasticity of self-employed-labour supply of about 0.1. 
The partial elasticity of substitution between demand for employee labour 
and demand for self-employed labour is equal to 0, and the partial 
elasticity between the 3 types of labour services of employees is equal to 
1. For most firm sectors this implies an own-price elasticity of employee-
labour demand of about -0.9 and an own-price elasticity of self-employed-
labour demand of about -0.2. The partial elasticity of substitution between 
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demand for capital and demand for labour is for most manufacturing sectors 
equal to 0.2 and for most services sectors between 0.5 and 1. 
In order to compute the virtual taxes we need data on excess demand for 
labour, differentiated by household sector. We measure the percentage of 
excess demand by unemployment compensation (divided by the replacement 
ratio). This gives only a rough measure of excess demand, but we think that 
the relative differences between household sectors are sufficiently well 
measured. Unemployment compensation consists of unemployment insurance 
benefits and social assistance grants to unemployed. Due to lack of data, 
unfunded unemployment compensation to public employees (about 7 per cent of 
total unemployment compensation) has been excluded. 
In absolute terms (measured by the amount of unemployment compensation), 
most of the excess demand occurs in the households of private employees and 
recipients of other social benefits (respectively 30 and 60 per cent of 
total excess demand); this is partly a consequence of our excluding 
unemployment compensation to public employees. Excess demand is almost 
evenly spread across income classes, and increases with household size. 
In relative terms (measured by unemployment compensation as a ratio of 
gross wages plus unemployment compensation), excess demand is about 10 per 
cent for low-paid labour services and 5 per cent for medium- and high-paid 
labour services. It is extremely high, more than 50 per cent, in households 
of social-benefit recipients; but labour supply (measured in gross wage) in 
these households is only 2 per cent of total labour supply, so that for the 
economy as a whole this high excess demand does not carry much weight. 
Since almost all households in the lowest income class are either 
pensioneers or recipients of other social benefits, relative excess demand 
is also high, more than 25 per cent; but these households receive only 3 
per cent of gross wages of all households. Excess demand is also high, 
about 10 per cent, for single-person households, who receive 6 per cent of 
total gross wages (most of these households consist of single-person 
pensioneers). 
As pointed out in section .3, partially unemployment benefits are 'realized' 
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virtual taxes. The benefits are financed by premiums paid on actual labour 
supply of households, labour demand of firms, and from general taxes. 
Therefore, the unemployment insurance scheme redistributes income from 
employed households towards unemployed ones. If one would adapt the Total 
Accounts by excluding these benefits, as far as these are not due to income 
redistribution, and the accompanying premiums, it is possible to compute a 
second set of virtual tax levels. If one compares this set with the set 
derived from the original Total Accounts, it is possible to determine to 
which level the unemployment benefits are 'realized' virtual taxes, which 
do not affect general equilibrium. Notice, that the remaining income 
redistributing unemployment benefits may be ascribed to the hard core of 
those who are unemployed and have small chances to find work. Thus, without 
taking into account these unemployment benefits, virtual taxation totally 
accounts for unemployment and includes these benefits. 
We have simulated a subsidy on the use of low-paid labour services by 
firms. The results refer to a uniform reduction of 1 per cent of the market 
wage of low-paid labour services, which amounts to a subsidiy of dfl. 300 
million. The reduction is assumed to be uniform, i.e. the same for all 
firms and for all employees in the low-paid category. 
It is assumed that the lump-sum distribution is not affected by changes in 
the virtual tax levels. Unemployment compensation is a component of lump-
sum transfers to private households. If owing to the subsidy, unemployment 
decreases, unemployment compensation and lump-sum transfers should then 
also decrease. This decrease is one possible source of finance for the 
subsidy. Also, because social security contributions for unemployment are 
earmarked taxes, they will change when unemployment changes. However, we 
have not taken into account the changes in unemployment compensation and 
social contributions that result from the subsidy, but have assumed that 
the subsidy is financed by a reduction of government outlay, evenly spread 
over expenditure on public goods, government savings, and unrequited 
transfers to households. Since employee labour is an important input in the 
production of public goods, a change in the demand for public goods may 
have considerable effects on the labour markets, and since transfers are a 
large component of household disposable income, a change in transfers may 
15 
have considerable effects on real income. Therefore the results of the 
simulation should be regarded more as an example of the possibilities of 
the model than as relevant for actual policy making. 
In carrying out the simulation, we have rationed household supply of the 3 
types of labour services of employees (low paid, medium paid, and high 
paid); labour services of self-employed have not been rationed. 
From table 4 it can be seen that a virtual tax indeed increases the price 
for the labour type on which it is raised. Owing to countervailing sub-
stitution effects at both the household and firm sides, trade is shifted to 
the other two labour markets, with a resulting decrease of the market 
prices. 
Table 4 Virtual tax price effects, percentage of market prices 
Virtual tax on labour 
Labour type low middle high 
Low-paid labour 
Medium-paid Labour 
High-paid labour 
0.1820 
-0.0010 
-0.0013 
-0.0065 
0.1548 
-0.0083 
-0.0049 
-0.0094 
0.1674 
In both cases with and without price-rigidities, the subsidy decreases the 
labour-cost for low-paid labour of firms. This increases the demand for 
low-paid labour, as the price-elasticities of the firms for this type of 
labour are positive. In the case of rationing demand raises 0.8% as no 
'tax'-shift can occur due to the fixed market wage, while in the case of 
price-flexibility demand raises by only 0.2%. To keep market prices 
constant, the virtual tax on low-paid labour must decrease. As low-paid 
labour becomes cheaper, demand for medium-paid and high-paid labour will be 
lowered. In case of rationing, this cannot be offset partially by a market 
price decrease, as those are fixed too. Therefore, the virtual taxes on the 
medium-paid, and high-paid labour must increase slightly. Ultimately, the 
demand for low-paid labour services increases by 0.8 per cent and the 
demand for medium- and high-paid labour services decreases by 0.1 per cent; 
in terms of jobs this means a increase of 15,000 low-paid jobs, and a 
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decrease of 2,000 medium-paid and 2,000 high-paid jobs, so that the total 
number of jobs increases by about 10,000 jobs. Because the net increase in 
jobs is smaller than the increase in low-paid jobs, the subsidy per extra 
job (dfl. 28,000) is higher than the average gross wage of low-paid 
employees (dfl. 25,000). With constant labour supply, a subsidy of about 5 
per cent (dfl. 1,500 million) would eliminate the difference in relative 
excess demand between low-paid labour services and medium- and high-paid 
labour services; relative excess demand would then be about 6 per cent. 
Figure 5 Comparison of the changes in market prices with and without 
rationing (perc.) 
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Figure 6 Comparison of the changes of output levels with and without 
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If one compares the changes in market prices without and with rationing, it 
turns out that the market price changes under virtual taxation are slightly 
larger, but remain less than 0.1% (see figure 5). The changes are magnified 
by roughly the same factor, except for the self-employed labour services, 
low-paid labour services, domestic services, agriculture and social 
services. The market price change of low-paid labour services is kept 
constant by definition in stead of being allowed to increase with 0.85%. 
Domestic services are produced by a firm using one single input: low-paid 
labour services, of which the net price decreases with 1 percent under 
rationing. This implies a 1 % market-price decrease for domestic services 
too, which is not accompanied by an increase in demand for this type of 
services owing to a low price elasticity. The same line of reasoning can be 
foliowed for the price of and demand for social services, explaining the 
relatively large decrease of the market price. The market-price for 
agricultural products increases by 0.15%, mainly because of the increase in 
the price of self-employed labour, which is an important input in 
agriculture. This priceincreases 0.95% under rationing instead of 0.21%. 
The relative decrease of total labour cost of firms can be translated 
neither into a larger trade of labour due to a relatively inflexible 
supply, nor into an increase of the prices for all types of labour 
together. Only, the demand for self-employed labour can be offset by a 
market-price increase for self-employed labour to retain market 
equilibrium. However, trade changes by less than 0.05%. 
From figure 6, it is clear that under rationing the output changes of 
almost all firms are magnified by a constant factor with respect to those 
under absence of rationing. The output change of the government firm is 
almost not affected because this change is dependent on the real income 
change of the public household, which is thé sole demander of this good. 
This change is quite equal under both conditions, as the total tax yield 
change is not affected much by introduction of rationing (0.09% in stead of 
0.08%). The firm which produces health services shows a slight increase in 
supply in stead of slight decrease. This is due to a larger output price 
change. The same holds for the firm producing social security services. 
Both firms have a relatively large demand for low-paid labour. 
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Figure 7 Comparison of real income changes with and without rationing 
(perc. of own income) 
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If one compares the real income changes of households (see figure 7), it 
turns out that the real income changes decrease for the households of 
public and private employees, but increase sharply for the households of 
self-employed under rationing. The latter is due to the large increase of 
the market price for self-employed labour, which has a large income effect. 
For the private and public employee households, the opposite occurs, as the 
market price of low-paid labour stays fixed instead of being increased by 
the subsidy. As the pensioner households do not supply much labour, their 
real income is affected mainly by the change in lump-sum income, which is 
proportional to the change in the total tax yield. For most private 
households the decrease in transfers (the financing of the subsidy) has a 
larger effect on real income than the increase in employment; thus real 
income decreases, in particular for households of social-benefits 
recipients. If we had taken into account that unemployment compensation 
decreases if employment increases, the decrease in real income would be 
more evenly spread: real income of households of private employees would 
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decrease more and real income of households of social-benefits recipients 
would decrease less. Only for some households whose labour supply consists 
of low-paid labour services, real income increases (private employees/2 and 
3 or more persons/lst income class). 
As already noticed, total tax revenue decreases about respectively 0.08 and 
0.09 per cent without and with rationing, which is somewhat less than the 
initial decrease of 0.1 per cent. This is mainly caused by the increase in 
employment, which leads to a larger revenue of the income tax and social-
security contributions. 
To end this section, it can be concluded that the effects under rationing 
differ from the effects without rationing. The main changes are due to the 
fixed market prices for low-, medium and high-paid labour. The low-paid 
labour cost decrease of firms under rationing is multiplied by a factor 5 
when compared to the outcome without rationing. The resulting market-price 
changes for other goods are multiplied by a similar factor too. Because 
without rationing the price of low-paid labour increases, real income of 
households of employees also increase, except in households that do not 
supply low-paid labour (e.g. single persons/3rd and 4th income class). Thus 
except for real income changes, the direction of the effects is the same 
with or without rationing, although the size of the effects may differ. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper a theoretically sound method to represent rationing by equi-
valent virtual taxes and a calibration-method based on this equivalence has 
been presented. First, the level of virtual taxation for the Netherlands in 
1979-1984 was studied. Next, the methods were applied to the 114-sector 
variant of the Keiler-model for the Netherlands in 1981. The effects of a 
low-paid-labour subsidy were studied. It turned out, that the welfare 
changes are affected by the introduction of labour rationing. Production in 
almost all sectors increases. The outcomes with rationing showed stronger 
effects of the subsidy on market prices and output levels, while the 
welfare effects were much more negative for the employee households. 
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Appendix A. Changes in the Keiler model in order to cope with rationing of 
households due to price-rigidities 
In this appendix we summarize the necessary adaptions in the Keiler model 
(see Keiler, 1980, chapter 12). We refer to notation and equations in 
Keiler (1980). 
The first question arises how to compute the price and income elasticities 
of the households. It is clear that besides the information about the cost 
shares, marginal cost shares, the knot-structure and substitution 
elasticities of the underlying CES-utility-functions some information must 
be added about the virtual tax rates and virtual lump-sum income for each 
household. This information can be given in either absolute amounts or 
relative figures with respect to real income. Then before the computation 
of the price and income elasticities may take place income shares are 
adapted according to 
n - 1.....N (Al) 
where these shares are expressed relative to total, non virtual income v. 
The tax shares T* are defined as A*/v, with A* as given in section 2. If 
one takes v as denominator, all income-concepts remain equal with and 
without rationing and virtual taxation. Notice, that the sum of budget-
shares does not equal A/V as usual (see Keiler, chapter 4) but to 
(A+EA*)/V. Still, the various adding-up restrictions hold, but with the 
virtual cost shares c* instead of the real cost shares c : 
"k' ie' 
c N„ + c = 0 , (A2) 
ri 
c*'^ - 1 , (A3) 
NR4 + cp*^ = 0 , (A4) 
where <p* = A*/v . Next one can compute aggregate household behaviour. 
First, use instead of equation (12.1) for each household i = !,...,!: 
c = c + r 
n n n 
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- i /-T i *i'--|-lf.Ti i *i'-v~i, rT i * i ' - , - l *i~*i , /-T i *i'-N-l i-ri qH = C I ' V H J ^ N H + V H J V O V H 3 N H t R + [l-nHrH ] r^A 
= NJpj+ N * 1 ^ 1 + n j l 1 . (A5) 
Thus the uncompensated price elasticities Ni are computed as an inter-
mediate result which is used to compute the price elasticities under 
rationing. It is simple Linear Algebra to show that 
i *i' 
fT i *iS-l T 1 "HrH ..,. 
(I - Y H ) - I + ^T^" • (A6) 
1
 "
 TH "H 
Using equations (A1)-(A6), it simple to prove that the next adding-up 
restrictions hold 
CH *H + CH = ° ' (A7) 
cj'nj - 1 , (A8) 
Nj* + / n j - 0 , (A9) 
where cpi - A1 /i/1 . The resulting behaviour as given by these elasticity 
matrices still fulfill the basic restrictions of consumer behaviour due to 
the real budget constraint. These constraints are necessary conditions to 
arrive at a meaningful solution of the model. 
Next, a similar equation like (12.7) can be derived using equation (A5) 
% " NHMPM + V + VH + n~p (A10) 
where the additional term N*Tt* is defined by 
* -* i Ai-*i * i - * , , , , 
N H T t H - . ^ / X 1 1 fcH • ( A 1 1 ) 1 = 1 
Suppose T* virtual taxes are distinguished. Then the NxT* tax-flexibility-
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matr ix n*1 i s defined by 
11 fcH = t H 1 1 (A12) 
These 'virtual tax flexibility matrices' makes it possible to introducé 
various rationing schemes with respect to the goods and households 
affected. The final equation of the Keiler model to solve becomes 
" VH^FM M F F n " "V M -M N F T F F HT 'MFXT " rtl 
1 
w 0 . ~p . 0 t 
(A13) 
From this equation all price changes, tax yield changes, etc. can be deri-
ved due to 1% changes of real and virtual taxes. 
As one supposes that market-price-rigidities are the origin of rationing 
changes of real taxes must be accompanied by virtual tax changes t* to 
keep p M n - 0 for some goods n = 1,...,N. Using a partitioning scheme on 
the solution of (A13) we derive that 
•MX 
rMY 
* 1 
^ T ^ T 
~k t 
^n ^ - * 
& t 
A A 
P P ' 
(A14) 
As p M Y =0 must hold, from (A14) the necessary tax changes t* can be 
computed from 
t *-l 
"NT AYTt 
(A15) 
This is only possible of the inverse of A*.T is a T*xT*-matrix of full 
rank. E.g., only one virtual tax-instrument may be defined for each 
rationed good affecting a household with flexible demand for this good and 
initial non-zero demand. When equation (A15) is substituted into (A14) the 
final solution of the Keiler model under price-rigidities on good Y is 
derived 
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5MX 
5MY = 
. p 
* *-l 
O 
* *-1 
A
 "
 A D A Y T ^ A Y T 
(A16) 
Using this solution all changes in quantities, welfare and net prices can 
be computed. 
To conclude this appendix it must be noted that the procedure outlined here 
is only valid for rationing of households, e.g. for unemployment. It 
presupposes that rationing is due to market price rigidities and the 
rationing schemes can be determined exogenously. As the concept of market 
prices is arbitrary, net price rigidities could be introduced by using the 
equations which relate market-prices and real tax-changes to individual net 
prices as given by Keiler (1980), eqs. (12.3) and (12.4). It results in 
minor adaptions of the changes outlined in this appendix. 
If initially rationing occurs, as said earlier, the benchmark year data-set 
must be adapted. To summarize, the next computational procedure must be 
foliowed 
1. Adapt the benchmark year data set according to Cornielje (1985). 
2. Check for an initial general equilibrium using the original data-set. 
3. Compute the individual price and income elasticity matrices of the 
households, using the adapted data-set. 
4. Next adapt the individual matrices according to equation (A5) if 
initially rationing occurs. 
5. Compute the effects of changes in real and virtual taxes. 
6. Compute the necessary virtual tax changes to induce price-rigidities for 
each real tax instrument. Compute the real price changes under price 
rigidities by summing the effects of real tax changes and accompanying 
virtual tax changes. 
7. Compute the changes in individual demand etc. . For this only the com-
bined effect of real tax changes and accompanying virtual tax changes on 
the prices and real tax yield has to be known. 
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